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MELVIN BURKE 
University of Maine 
Land Reform in the 
Lake Titicaca Region 
Bolivia's National Revolutionary 
party (MNR) seized power in April 1952 and a year and a half later in 
August 1953 promulgated the agrarian reform law, which redistributed 
the land of the haciendas to the former Indian tenants and others. This 
comparative economic study of the haciendas and ex-haciendas in the 
Lake Titicaca region of Bolivia and Peru was undertaken to answer 
three illlportant, but largely unrcsolwu, tlUcSliolls ahout lalld re-forlll : (I) 
Whieh land-tenure system-large estates or small peasant farms-affords 
the agriculture laborers and cultivators the greater freedom of mobility, 
opportunity, income, and education? (2) Did the land-tenancy conditions 
of a typical latifundio ("large landed estate") land-tenure system 1 bor-
der on serfdom and preclude freedom and was this system largely re-
sponsible for the low standard of living and education of the rural popu-
lation in a traditional agrarian economy? (3) Is there any validity to the 
contention that "land reform is not only a reform of the way land is held 
but just as much reform of the man who tills the land?" 2 
LA TIFUNDIO LAND TENURE AND LAND REFORM 
Prior to the MNR revolution, Bolivia was an underdeveloped country 
with a traditional agrarian sector, characterized by a latifundio system. 
This chapter is un expandell vcr~i\ln (If my aniL-1.:. 'Talld Rdnrlll and Its l'Ih'ct "pon 
Production lind Productivity in the lake Titicaca Regiun," published in hWI/OlI/it· 
Development and Cultural Change, 18, no. 3 (April 1970), pp. 410-50. 
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The agricultural sector was dearly differentiated from the nonagricultural 
sector. The nonagricultural sector comprised the extractive industries and 
the transport, wnstruction, and trading activities associated with, and 
dependent upon, mining. Each sector had its peculiar problems. It was 
tht! agrarian sector, however, which was usually singled out as being the 
most backward, unproductive, and stagnant. Although approximately 70 
percent of the Bolivian population was engaged in agricultural produc-
tion in 1950, this sector was the source of only 30 percent of the gross 
national product and less than 3 percent of the value of the exports. In 
addition, roughly 40 percent of imports were food and other agricultural 
good~, most of which could have been domestically produced.3 A partial 
explanation for Bolivia's backwardness can be found in an examination 
of the prerevolutionary land-tenure system. 
THE LATIFUNDIO LAND-TENURE SYSTEM 
Before 1952 land concentration was very great. According to the 1950 
agricultural census, approximately 6 percent of the largest agricultural 
units constituted 92 percent of the land, while 80 percent of the smallest 
held only 1 percent of the land. Three-fourths of the country's agricultural 
population had no property rights. Although 30 percent of the total land 
area was classified as arable, only 2 percent was cultivated. Also, there 
was an inverse relationship between the size of holding and area cultivated. 
While the smallest agricultural units cultivated 44 percent of their land, 
the largest estates, comprising 92 percent of all land, cultivated only 1 per-
cent of their holdings. 
These statistics do little more than reveal the fact that agriculture in 
Bolivia was dominated by large landed estates. The haciendas, moreover, 
were not only agricultural enterprises; they were social units. This is evi-
dent in the tenancy arrangement under which the land was operated and 
its product divided between the tiller and owner. The c9ionos ("Indian 
tenants") were traditionally, and often quasi-legally, tied to the hacien-
das. For the right to use a small parcel of the estate's poorer quality land, 
they were required in varying degrees to render to the landowner their 
labor, tools, animals, and servitude. 
THE LAND REFORM 
The concentration of landed property in so few hands, the less than 
progressive tenancy conditions, and the traditional methods of production 
combined to render the Bolivian latifundio land-tenure system an anach-
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ronism. Many Bolivians and others came to consider this land-tenure sys-
tem as one of the major obstacles to both agricultural and general 
economic efficiency and progress. Among these individuals were the 
leaders of the Muv;miento Naciunalista Revolucionariu who were re-
sponsible for the agrarian reform law which states that the soil, subsoil, 
and waters of the nation belong to the state but guaranteed private prop-
erty which fulfills a "social function." It also committed the state to an 
TABLE! 1 
BOLIVIAN LAND REDISTRIBUTION 
1953- 1965 
-- --- -_._._-
Number of 
Legal Re- Family Hectares 
distribution Titles Dis- Heads Hectares Reverted 
Year Cases tributed Benefittd Distributed to the State 
----_ ....• _--_._---_. _._ '----
1953 
1954 
1955 32 3,400 2,809 51,8ll 
1956 75 4,463 3,863 46,604 579 
1957 281 11,400 8,028 276,293 103 
1958 216 9,193 5,709 201,631 367 
1959 313 18,380 12,097 316,462 4,040 
1960 904 38,897 22,410 825,871 26,899 
1961 1,186 45,511 28,2\0 1,129,442 38,379 
1962 1,880 50,227 28,843 1,255,791 24,950 
1963 1,185 47,461 40,641 1,271,686 91,905 
1964 626 18,317 11,295 531,946 33,497 
1965 202 15,600 9,652 365,042 23,2~~ 
Total 6,900 262,849 173,557 6,272,579 243.960 
Source: Bolivia, Departamento de Estadistica, Servicio Nacional Reforma Agraria (February 
8, 1966), unpublished. Provided by the department head, Sr. Hector Mercado Negrete 
"equitable" distribution of land. The land-reform decree further stipulated 
that small peasant farms, cooperatives, and indigenous communities were 
to be created and expanded by the redistribution of all the latifundio land 
and portions of "medium properties" and "agricultural enterprises." • The 
expropriation was to be accompanied by monetary compensation ill the 
form of 2 percent, twenty-five-year, agrarian bonds ultimately paid for 
by the new beneficiaries of this reform, the campesinos ("countrymen"). 
Since the passage of the Bolivian land reform, substantial progress has 
been made in legally redistributing the land. A comparison of the figures 
in the 1950 agricultural census with those in table 1 shows that, of the 
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32,749,850 hectares surveyed in 1950, 6,272,579 or 19 percent of this 
amount had been legally redistributed to individual campesinos by the 
beginning of 1966. A number of expedientes ("files of documents") relat-
ing to the legal distribution of land are still being processed, but, more 
important, a substantial amount of land was illegally expropriated by the 
campesinos. 
In the midst of the early revolutionary years, 1952-1953, the campe-
sinos organized militant sindicatos ("labor unions"), obtained control of 
the countryside, and confiscated or redistributed the lands of many 
estates-some of which were not liahle for expropriation under the new 
law. It is important to bear in mind that the actual Bolivian land reform 
is distinct from that expressed in the legal statute. Land reform in Bolivia 
destroyed the latifundio land-tenure system and created the small campesino 
family-operated holdings. The Bolivian landowners were never officially 
compensated by the government or the carnpesinos for their expropriated 
properties. The only compensation received was in the form of . ~og~_ 
official payments made by the campesinos to a few fortunate landowners. 
President Victor Paz Estenssoro expressed the sum and substance of the 
true Bolivian land reform when he said: "We made the agrarian reform. 
We took the land from the unproductive and absentee landowners, and we 
have given it to the campesinos who work it." 6 
THE LAKE TITICACA REGION 
The Lake Titicaca region is unique, since it is probably the only area 
in the world where haciendas and expropriated haciendas existed side by 
side in a relatively homogeneous setting.· As such, it afforded a re-
markable opportunity to conduct a comparative economic study of land 
tenure, land reform, and their effect upon human resources and the 
economy. 
A sampling of four Peruvian haciendas and four Bolivian ex-haciendas 
had been chosen for examination and comparison. From a nearly com-
plete list of all the large landed estates in the Peruvian sector of the 
region, four haciendas were selected. These were livestock and grain 
enterprises that were absentee owned and representative in size, produc-
tion, and productivity. From the other side of the border, four Bolivian 
ex-haciendas with similar characteristics were selected for comparison. 
Every attempt was made to insure comparability in such areas as distance 
from the lake, elevation, water access, and climate. In short, every 
Land Reform ill the Lake Titicaca Region 305 
Bolivian ex-hacienda investigated was matched as closely as (Xlssible 
with a comparable Peruvian hacienda." Nevertheless, because all available 
data indicate that the prereform Bolivian haciendas were usually smaller 
in size and supported larger populations than their Peruvian counterparts, 
the four Bolivian ex-haciendas investigated possessed these different char-
acteristics. (See table 2.) A partial explanation for the difference in estate 
TABLE 2 
SAMPLE OF P EIIUVIAN HACIENDAS AND BOLIVIAN Ex-H ACIENDAS 
I'Cl'lIviUII lIu~iclI"u s 
II III IV Total 
--------- . - --- ---
Area in hectares 4,850 5,719 4,244 16,3 10 31,123 
Campesino families 35 23 23 94 175 
Family heads interviewed 34 23 22 88 167 
Percentage interviewed 97% 100% 96% 94% 95% 
Bolivian Ex-Haciendas 
II III IV Total 
---- - ----
Area in hectares 5,591 2,348 1,518 5,221 14,678 
Campesino families 287 65 108 209 669 
Family heads interviewed 68 30 48 21 167 
Percentage interviewed 24% 46% 45% 10% 25% 
----- ---
size and population density among the two sampled groups can be found 
in the locations of the major consumer markcts in the two nations. The 
prercform Bolivian haciendas had a greater access to n large COIlSUlller 
market, the capital city of La Paz. Thus, these estates had a nearby 
market for bulky, high-cost transport products, such as potatoes, ocas, 
and similar foods which are both labor and land intensive in production . 
On the other hand, the lack of a similarly accessible market in the Peruvian 
sector has historically oriented production toward high-value, low-cost 
transport products, such as wool, for international export. 
Because a hacienda is dichotomized into that portion utilized by and 
for the landowner and that used by the campesinos for their subsistence, 
and because an ex-hacienda is separated into those farmed cooperatively 
and those farmed individually by the campesinos, two different ques-
tionnaires were used in the field study. In both cases, the services of an 
interpreter were necessary, since the Indians chose to answer in their 
native Aymara and Quechua languages. Also, due to the large number of 
306 MELVIN BURKE 
campesinos encountered on the Bolivian ex-haciendas, only a random 
sample was selected for interviewing. 
The field research for this article was carried out in a sedentary agri-
cultural and stock-raising area. The Lake Titicaca region is composed of 
the Altiplano portions of the department of Puno, Peru, and the depart-
ment of La Paz, Bolivia, as seen in figure 1. Prior to 1953, the culture, 
• EX - HACIENDAS 
D HACIENDAS 
FIG. 1. LAKE TITICACA REGION 
APPIIOX SCALE 
I 
o &0 MILES 
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the economy, and, above all, the latifundio land-tenure system of the 
Bolivian sector were nearly identical to those of the Peruvian sector. For 
example, in the department of Puno, 80 percent of the smallest agricul-
tural units owned 3.2 percent of the land while 0.2 percent of the largest 
units possessed 60 percent of the land. The same inverse relationship be-
tween size of holding and the area cultivated existed here as in La Paz. 
Nearly all the large estates were absentee owned, and the tenancy con-
ditions resembled those of prereform Bolivia except for the differences 
discussed below. Finally, 70 percent of the Peruvian population was en-
gaged in stagnant and unproductive agriculture.1 Latifundio land-tenure 
systems are not dynamic, and in many ways the Peruvian haciendas 
investigatl!d resemhled the prercforlll Bolivian hadendas. 
The Peruvian haciendas served only as imperfect proxies, however, 
since there were a number of notable differences between the Peruvian 
haciendas and the prereform Bolivian haciendas. The Peruvian Resolu-
cion Suprema no. 14 of January 17,1964, required all campesino laborers 
to be paid a minimum daily wage, and Resolucion Suprema no. 18 of 
May 21,1965, formally designated the department of Puno as an agrarian 
reform zone." Even though these decrees were either not fully obeyed or 
inoperative, they modified the Peruvian latifundio land-tenure system. 
First, because some money wages were paid to campesinos, labor was no 
longer a free resource. Secondly, if they exceeded the average productivity 
of haciendas in the department, the agrarian reform law enabled hacien-
das to retain between three thousand and eight thousand hectares of 
land. After the 1965 agrarian reform went into effect, the Peruvians 
have invested in capital equipment and livestock, as well as paid their 
laborers minimum wages. In short, these laws were instrumental in bring-
ing about changes in the resource mix within the haciendas. Nevertheless, 
if one would ignore all of the cash income of the Peruvian campesinos, 
much of the newly acquired capital, and some of the international wool 
sales of the Peruvian haciendas, one would approximate the prereform 
Bolivian sector of the Lake Titicaca region. 
As can be seen in table 2 on page 305 two important distinctions 
between the haciendas and ex-haciendas must be borne ill mind. First, 
although the same absolute number of campesino family heads was inter-
viewed on both sides of the border, the sample of 167 Peruvian campe-
sinos represented 95 percent of all hacienda employees, while the 167 
Bolivians interviewed represented only 25 percent of the total number of 
campesino family heads on the ex-haciendas. Secondly, while the same 
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number of haciendas and ex-haciendas was included in the sample, the 
Peruvians had twice the amount of land as the Bolivians. Finally, official 
governmental statistics and studies of other Peruvian haciendas and 
Bolivian ex-haciendas were used throughout this study as supplemental 
sources of data and information. Studies of prereform Bolivian haciendas 
were also used for the historical comparison of before and after the land 
reform. 
RELATIVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF 
PERUVIAN HACIENDAS AND BOLIVIAN EX-HACIENDAS 
ECONOMIC RESOURCES 
In an attempt to make the analysis of the cffect of the Bolivian land 
reform upon human resource development more readily comprehensible, 
this section will briefly summarize the economic performance of the sam-
pled Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas in the Lake Titicaca 
region." Total population estimates based upon the sample averages ob-
tained in the field study indicate that the Bolivian ex-haciendas sup-
ported four times as many people with only half as much land as the 
Peruvian haciendas. Thus, the population density of the Bolivian ex-
haciendas was more than eight times that of the Peruvian haciendas (see 
table 3). 
The greater population density of the Bolivian ex-haciendas was re-
TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF HACIENDA AND Ex·HACIENDA POPULATIONS 
Total population 
Total "weighted economically 
active" population' 
Population density per square 
mile 
Peruvian 
Haciendas 
998.0 
560.0 
8.3 
Bolivian 
Ex· Haciendas 
3,847.0 
2,141.0 
67.9 
Note: In this table and all the following ones, except where indicated, 
the figures represent projections based on the sample averages obtained 
in the field sludy. 
a. Computed 011 the basis of the following weights furnished by the 
Olicina Nacional de Evaluacion de Recursos Naturales de Puno, Peru: 
male over seventeen years of age = 1.0; female over seventeen years of 
age = 0.8; male and female ten to seventeen years of age = 0.5; and all 
others = 0.0. 
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flected in the I!I.oIe...i.QJ~lI.sive utilization of the land. as seen in table 4. In 
the aggregate the Bolivian ex-haciendas cultivated six times as many hec-
tares as the Peruvian haciendas during the agricultural year 1964- 1965. 
Approximately 5 percen t of the Bolivian ex-hacienda land was cultivated 
as compared to less than 0.5 percent of the Peruvian hacienda land. l o 
On the Peruvian estates the lower popula tion density and greatcr land 
extension were reflected in the greater specialization in sheep ranching, as 
seen in table 5. By far the most numerous and important type of capital 
found on both the hacienda and ex-hacienda was livestock. 
Reducing all grazing livestock to the common denominator of a sheep 
("unida animal ovino" Dr V.A.O.) enabled the computation of some in-
teresting livestock statis tics (table 6). When the livestock is weighted 
accordingly, data show that the Peruvian haciendas had twice as much 
livestock as the Bolivian ex-haciendas. Taking population and land into 
consideration, the livestock density per hectare was nearly equal for both 
sampled groups, although the Peruvian campesinos shepherded approxi-
mately eight times as many animals as their Bolivian counterparts. 
Land, labor, and livestock capital were the most important economic 
resources on these trad itiqnal units of production. Of lesser influence 
upon production and productivity were physical capital a~d management. 
It is difficult to say whether haciendas or ex-haciendas possessed the 
greater quantity of phys ical capital, since it was virtually impossible to 
weigh the greater quantity of hand tools and new constructions of the 
campesinos on the Bolivian ex-haciendas against the old physical plant 
and more modern machi nery and equipment on the Peruvian haciendas. 
In addition, the institutional nature of these traditional agrarian units 
of production suggests that possession of economic resources did not im-
ply their rational or com pie te utilization in production. For example, al-
though the Peruvian hacicndas employed professional managers. owned 
large tracts of land, and used agricultural equipment such as tractors, the 
influence of all these upon production was less than one would expect. The 
Peruvian haciendas were not only absentee owned, but to a degree, 
absentee managed. This partially explains the observed underutilization 
of agricultural machinery on the estates." Large extensions of land were 
also lying idle or underu tilized on these estates, since the Peruvian land-
owners only put about half their total land in production. On the other 
hand, because a smaller quantity of labor was combined with greater 
amounts of other resou rces such as land and livestock, the Peruvian 
campesino's labor and time were fully utilized on the haciendas. 
TABLE 4 
UTILIZATION OF LAND 
(1/1 H ectares) 
Type of Land 
Peruvian Haciendas 
Level 
Hill and/ or broken 
Total 
Bolivian Ex-Haciendas 
Level 
Hill and/ or broken 
Total 
Cultivated by and for 
Campesinos Hacendados 
5.5 53.0 
18.5 41.0 
24.0 94.0 
342.0 10.0 
378.0 2.0 
720.0 12.0 
Pasture and/ or Land in Res! of 
Campesinos Hacendados Joint Use Total Land Area 
220.0 15,582.0 4.328.5 20.189.0 
655.0 10.219.5 10.934.0 
875.0 15,582.0 14,548.0 31,123.0 
2,678.0 685.0 2,929.0 6,644.0 
602.0 1,529.0 5,523.0 8,034.0 
3,280.0 2,214 .0 8.452.0 14,678.0 
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TABLE 5 
DISIRIDUTION OF TorAL LIVESTOCK 
P...:ru Bolivia 
Campcsilws H~cclltla<.1us Total Campcsino5 C()operativc~ Total 
Sheep 
Cattle 
Horses 
Borras' 
Alpaca 
Llama 
Fowl 
Pigs 
9,592 
1,334 
385 
229 
607 
321 
253 
61 
52,955 
1,512 
1\5 
7 
236 
41 
7 
62,547 
2 ,846 
500 
236 
843 
321 
295 
68 
18,156 
2,348 
16 
381 
1,455 
1,508 
1,704 
845 
42 
38 
19,001 
2,39U 
16 
381 
1,455 
1,508 
1,778 
Nvre: Nearly allthc sheep and cattle of the Bolivian and Peruvian campcsilll>s wcr" (If the 
dcgencrate criollo ("Joll1csti C") type, while those of the Peruvian hacclldados w<.,rc pre-
dominantly crossbreeds bctw-een criollos and imported (improwu) sLOck . 
II . Mille Illmbs not yet tW(~ yellrs old. 
Oil the Bolivian ex-haciendas the situation was reversed; it was I.a!;)or 
which was not completely expended on production, and land which was 
more fully exploited. aecause the Bolivian campesino was not required 
t.(), render his labor services to any landowner, and because his small hold-
ings and animal herds <lid not require all his time, he possessed greater 
leisure and time for wo rk outside the ex-hacienda. Comparing them with 
. the Peruvian haciendas, more labor and an equal amount of livestock 
were combined with each hectare of land on the Bolivian ex-haciendas. 
Thus, land was more fully utilized on the Bolivian ex-haciendas. 
TABLE 6 
COMPARISON OF HACIENDA AND Ex-HACIENDA LIVESTOCK 
Tota l livestock (U.A.O.'s) 
Livestock (U.A.O.',..) per hectare 
Livestock (U.A.O.'s) per campesino 
family 
Pcruvillll 
Hu.;i..:llllus 
89,139 
2.9 
512 
II1lliviUIl 
Ex-' luc.:iclldus 
44,408 
3.0 
66 
Note: There are var iOllS rncthoJs used 10 compule this sheep t:,\uivalt:nt 
unit (lI.A.O.) whicl-:. is the reduction of all grazing animals to the lanu 
capacily for an adu It sheep. The ooe used here is that of the Agrarian 
Reform Office of PU.llO, Peru: sheep = I, cultlc = 6, horses and burros 
= 8, alpacas and Il<a.mas = 3, and pigs = 2. 
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TOTAL-VALUE PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The different amounts of economic resources available to the hacien-
das and ex-haciendas and the diverse utilization of the same manifest 
themselves most obviously in production and productivity. The Peruvian 
haciendas raised approximately $170,000 worth of agricultural produce 
during the 1964-1965 year, which is only slightly larger than the esti-
mated $149,000 produced by the Bolivian ex-haciendas.'2 Four times as 
many Bolivian campesinos were engaged in producing nearly the same 
output on only half as much land; in other words the Bolivian ex-hacien-
das were, on the average, twice as productive with respect to land and 
one-fourth as productive with respect to labor as the Peruvian haciendas. 
Productivity statistics and estimates of the average monetary return to 
each available economic resource are set forth in table 7. 
TABLE 7 
VALUE PRODUCTIVITY 
(/1/ Oollar,l) 
----------------------------------
Peruvian Bolivian 
Statistics Haciendas Ex-Haciendas 
.----~-~---.---
Value output $ 5.47 $10.15 
-Hectare--
Value output 304.00 69.62 Man-years of labor-; 
Value animal products 0.38 0.40 -iTvestockc-a-pit~ 
Value crops 105.31· 88.45 Hectaresciliirvated 
a. The man-year equivalents of labor figures are the same as the 
"economically active population" ligures computed in table 3, p. 308. 
b. This figure of the total value of livestock was computed by 
multiplying the average prices of animals sold in tables 16 and 17 by 
the total number of animals on the haciendas and ex-haciendas in 
table 6 on p. 311. 
c. This average-value figure inCludes only the output of the three 
haciendas for which dutu afC availahle, i.e., it excludes that of 
hacienda IV. 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY WITH RESPECT TO 
SIZE OF FIRM AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
Which were more efficient-the Peruvian haciendas or the Bolivian 
ex-haciendas? Because of the limitations of the data and the lack of a 
general consensus upon the criteria of efficiency, the reader should be 
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forewarned not to expect a definitive nnswcr to this Cilicstion . For, al-
though few economists condone the tenure conditions on the large ha-
ciendas, many rally to defend the haciendas in the name of economies 
of scale and labor productivity. Thus, an important consideration is 
whether size economies resulting from such indivisible inputs as capital 
equipment and management existed on the Peruvian haciendas. It appears 
that the underutilization of agricultural machinery, management, and land 
on the Peruvian estates prevented the realization of any size economies. 
Also, no evidence of financial economies of scale, such as quantity dis-
counts from marketing, was uncovered. This does not imply that the 
small campesino holdings on the Bolivian ex-haciendas were either effi-
cient or of optimum size. The implication is, however, that the large 
landed estates in the sample were not necessarily more efficient than the 
small eampesino holdings by virtue of size alone. In brief, the findings of 
this study indicate that there probably is no overwhelming advantage to 
any particular size Altiplano agricultural unit of production under existing 
institutional and technological conditions. 
But what is the economic significance of the difference in labor pro-
ductivity on the haciendas and ex-haciendas? Was the lower labor pro-
ductivity of the Bolivian ex-haciendas evidence of a less efficient allocation 
of resources? What is needed to analyze this allocative efficiency is in-
formation on prices of both resources and production at the margin, 
which, unfortunately, was not available. Even information obtained from 
production functions would have limited value, since the price of land and 
labor to the Bolivian campesino were nonmonetary opportunity costs. It 
appears that the Peruvian haciendas were more efficient in their use of 
labor. However, when labor is abundant relative to land and capital, as it 
was in both sectors of the region, the area yielding the higher output 
per hectare, in this case the Bolivian ex-haciendas, can be considered 
more efficient. 
When technology, incentive, and employment are taken into con-
sideration, neither the Peruvian haciendas nor the Bolivian ex-haciendas 
could be considered to be more eflicient or to perform ill 1\ Sllpcrior 
economic manner. The evidence suggests that both sampled groups were 
producing short of their optimum. 
PRODUCTION FOR THE MARKET 
With more and better breeds of animals, twice as much land, and one-
fourth the population of the Bolivian ex-haciendas, one would expect the 
Peruvian haciendas to produce more for the market. This is precisely 
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what the data reveal, using the total value of products sold as crude ap-
proximation of agricultural surplus . In the agricultural year 1964-1965 
the sampled Peruvian haciendas sold approximately $142,000 worth of 
products on the market as compared to about $51,450 sold by the Bolivian 
ex-haciendas.'J Not only did the Peruvians sell nearly three times as 
much in absolute dollar value as the Bolivians, but they sold a greater 
proportion of their output. The Peruvian haciendas sold 85 percent and 
the Bolivian ex-haciendas 34 percent of their respective gross outputs. 
The sale of wool accounts for the greater part of this difference, how-
ever. Approximately $65,000 of foreign exchange was earned by the 
Peruvian hacendados from the sale of wool in international markets." If 
one subtracts this amount from the Peruvian hacienda sales, the value of 
products sold in their respective domestic markets by the haciendas and 
ex-haciendas is more nearly equal. Although the four Peruvian haciendas 
and the four Bolivian ex-haciendas investigated constituted only a frac-
tion of all those in the Lake Titicaca region, they were quite similar-and 
in many respects virtually identical-to most other haciendas and 
ex-haciendas in the region. 
THE EFFECTS OF THE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM 
To what extent does this difference in economic performance between 
the Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas reflect changes 
brought about by the Bolivian land reform? In any attempt to answer 
this question, let us begin by briefly outlining the major characteristics of 
the prereform Bolivian haciendas, since the Peruvian haciendas investi-
gated, as stated above, served only as imperfect proxies for the prereform 
Bolivian haciendas. 
PREREFORM BOLIVIAN HACIENDAS 
The prereform Bolivian haciendas were, to a much greater degree than 
the Peruvian ones, mere agglomerations of small Indian saYGllas ("usu-
fructuary tracts of land"). In the Lake Titicaca region, approximately two-
thirds of the prcreform Bolivian haciendas were cultivated exclusively by 
and for the Indians, who also owned approximately three-fourths of the 
livestock. 
The Bolivian haciendas did not possess great quantities of productive 
physical capital or employ production methods other than those tradi-
tionally used by their Indian tenants. Nor did they special,ize in wool 
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production for the inte mational market, and nearly all their sheep and 
cattle were of the deger.cralc criollo type. Thc prcrcform Bolivian hacicll-
aas also supported larger populations and cultivated a greater portion of 
their lands than did the .Peruvian haciendas. 
CHANGES IN RESOURCE S 
Since the Bolivian I.a.nd reform, the population of the ex-haciendas in 
the Lake Titicaca region has ~oubled as a result of the natural increase in 
populatiQu and migration to these lands from the indigenous communities, 
lIilages, and cities. Perhaps this growth helps to explain why La Paz 
does not have the extensive barriadas ("slums") typical of most large 
Latin American cities. This population increase, in turn, has given rise to 
a slightly more intensive use of the land. Although many new campesino 
~ayafias were carved out of the old hacendado ("estate owner's") lands 
to accommodate the larger population, ~he average sayan a has nol c.:hanged 
in size or composition si nee the land reform. 
However, since the I and reform, there has been a small reduction in 
the total number of nalimals in the sector. This occlIm:J hecause the 
landowners were able to sell some of their animals, some perished through 
neglect, and an additie> nal number were confiscated by the campesinos. 
Since that time, howe"er. the herds have been gradually built up to 
nearly their prercform size. But there has been a slight deterioration ill 
the quality of the shee.F and cattle, or, at least, there has been no im-
provement of the herds since 1953. Also, a decrease has occurred in the 
average size of the can1pesino herd. These statements are supported in 
table 8 by data from .he field study, the Viacha study, and the 1946 
ministry of agriculture study-all major sources of information drawn 
upon in this comparisoa. 
Finally, since 1953 t.l1e old adobe structures of the haciendas have de-
teriorated, because tbe campesinos refused to replace their paja 
("grass") roofs. This destruction, however, has been compensated for by 
the construction of new- campesino homes and schools. In addition, since 
the Bolivian land reform disinvestment in the form of a decrease in the 
amount of agricultural machinay has taken place on the ex-haciendas. 
Rarely does one see a tractor today in the Bolivian sector of the Lake 
Titicaca region. It is ifTlpossible to determine how much of this mobile 
machinery and equipme nt was removed by the landowners and how much 
was destroyed as a res Lilt of campesino indifference and neglect. There 
has been no inflow of agricultural equipment in the area either for re-
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TABLE 8 
ECONOMIC R"-SOURCf.5 BEfORE AND AnER LAND REFORM 
Ikfure Land Reform' After Lund Reform b 
Population density per square mile 
Livestock (U.A.O.) density per hectare 
U.A.O.'s owned per campesino family 
Approximate average size of 
campesino sayana (in hectares) 
Total land area cultivated 
35.0 
3.3 
93.0 
6.0-8.0 
1.0-6.0% 
68.0 
3.0 
66.0 
6.0-8.0 • 
5.0% 
a. Source: ESludio socio-ecol/omica ell las provillcias de omasuyos, ingavi, y los andes del 
deparramem de La paz (La Paz, 1946). 
b. Sources: Author's field study and Esludio ecollomico esladislico del Canton Viacha 
(La Paz, 11J65). 
c. It is obvious that the average Bolivian campesino did not possess, let alone own, 
belween len and thirty-five hectares of land as prescribed by article 15 of tbe Decreto Ley 
de la Reforma Agraria. 
placement or for addition to stock since 1953, because the Bolivian cam-
pesinos have neither the funds n'or the inclination to purchase this type of 
capital. 
('IIANGES IN ECONOMIC I'EI(J'ORMANCE 
It is difficult to compare the economic performance of the prereform 
Bolivian haciendas with the present-day ex-haciendas, because compari-
sons over time may reflect climatic or price changes above all else. Con-
sequently, a rigorous historical comparison cannot be made. Nevertheless, 
the subject wil1 be briefly commented upon because of the controversy 
surrounding the issue of land redistribution and its economic consequences. 
Because there were no verifiable size economies operative on the rela-
tively productive Peruvian haciendas, there is even more reason to 
suspect that no economies of scale were realized by the prereform Bolivian 
haciendas. Consequently, when the lands used exclusively by the land-
owners and portions of their criollo livestock were parceled among the 
campesinos after the land reform, it is unlikely that any size economies of 
production were lost. 
The evidence accumulated in this study suggests that I,abor productivity 
on the Bolivian ex-haciendas has decreased, land productivity has !n-
cfl.:uSl.:d, and capital productivity has remained unchanged since the land 
reform. This can be accounted for largely by the increased population, 
greater use of the more marginal land, and the small decrease in agricul-
tural equipment. Also, in part, the decrease in labor productivity reflects 
the increase in leisure and off-the-farm employment of the Bolivian 
campesinos. 
Lal/d Reform in the LaAe Titicaca Region 317 
An increase in the number of people engaged in marginal agriculture 
and a decrease in agricultural productivity per unit of labor are, however, 
normally considered by econolllists to be prima facie evidl~nl'e or an in-
efficient allocation of a nation's resources. But Bolivia was not a full em-
ployment economy, and the decrease in labor productivity in the agrarian 
sector must be considered in conjunction with the increased employment 
in agriculture and the higher land productivity which resulted from the 
land reform. In short, the increased marginal farming may well be an 
efficient allocation of the nation's resources in the short run or until such 
time as alternative employment is available. 
For example, agricultural outpu t in the region has increased since the 
Bolivian land reform. However, because of their greater numbers and 
greater per capita consumption of food, the Bolivian campesinos have 
retained a greater share of the region's larger output. At the same time, 
the agricultural produce sold in the market has equaled prereform levels. 
At least, this is what most official government statistics indicate. 
Bolivian campesinos also have increased their commercial activity since 
t~e expropriated landowners no longer supply the markets with food and 
other agricultural proullce. This is seen in the 1l1lllllTOllS Incal r.lir., whidl 
have come into existence since the land reform, as well as the increased 
coming and going of the Altiplano campesinos. The Bolivian campesino, 
. like his Guatemalan counterpart, is a businessman. As Sol Tax observed, 
"The Indian is perhaps above all else an entrepreneur, a businessman, 
always looking for a new means of turning a penny."" 
However, unless teeD no logy and human and physical capital are forth-
coming, the agricultural output and SLJrplus, at best, will be augmented at 
a very slow pace wit:hin the existing framework of the traditional 
agrarian sector. As Theodore W. Schultz and others have shown, these 
apparent traditional optima can only be exceeded by the infusion into 
the agrarian sector of nontraditional inputs, such as improved seed, 
equipment, livestock, aI1d modern methods of production.'· Agricultural 
credit, extension services, and other forms of assistance arc needed for 
this task. 
CAMPESINO INCOME, CONSUMPTION, MOBILITY, 
AND EDUCATION 
The growing emphasis on capital investments in human beings is one encour-
aging trend in current discussions oTtl'ie··l'r\alhSprings of economic growth. This 
emphasis is of primary importance to agricultural development. Improving 
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the quality of the labor input through new knowledge and new skills offers 
one rewarding opportunity for agricultural capital investment. For this reason, 
a major test of the performance of land-tenure structures is to be found in 
the role they play in advancing capital investment in educationY 
Labor is one of the l1Iost abundant economic resources that underde-
veloped nations possess. The labor force is only an asset to economic 
efficiency and progress when it is healthy, educated, and mobile. Many 
development economists have theoretically demonstrated the merits of: 
(1) freeing the agricultural labor force so that its members may migrate to 
the industrial sector when conditions warrant, (2) providing the laborers 
with sufficient income to purchase manufactured products as well as to 
keep body and soul together, and (3) educating and informing these in-
dividuals so that they may become more productive economic resources 
and participating citizens. But hu w did the two sampled groups of cam-
pesinos in the Lake Titicaca region fare under the different land-tenure 
systems? Did the haciendas of the Peruvian sector or the ex-haciendas of 
the Bolivian sector afford the campesinos a greater freedom (i.e., mobility 
and opportunity), income, and education? 
To begin with, the sampled populations possessed many similar char-
acteristics. For example, the average size of a' household was 5.70 on the 
Peruvian estates and 5.75 on the Bolivian ex-haciendas. The average 
ages of the two sampled groups were twenty-four and twenty-three 
respectively. In both sampled groups roughly 55 percent of the popula-
tion was under twenty years of age. 
CAMPESINO INCOME 
An investigation of the income patterns of the campesinos on the 
sampled Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas was conducted 
! in the field study. One would expect for a number of reasons the Peru-
: vian campesino to have a higher income and standard of living than his 
Bolivian counterpart. First of all, the Peruvian campesino owned, on 
the average, twice as much livestock as the Bolivian campesino and had 
at his disposal an equal amount of land. Secondly, the Peruvian was more 
than four times as productive on the hacienda as the Bolivian was on the 
lex-hacienda. Finally, the Peruvian, unlike the Bolivian campesino, re-
,ceived a money wage for his labor on the hacienda. Table 9 gives an esti-
mate or Peruvian c:llllpesino wages for thl~ agricultural year 1964- 1965. 
Table 10 shows the paradox in thc data obtained in the field study, in-
dicating that it is the .8.01ivian campesino, not the Peruvian , who received 
the greater income. 
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Part of this apparent paradox can be explained by the ~igher prices 
that Bolivian campesinos received in the market for their animals; this 
higher price is also the one imputed for the animals consumed by the 
campesinos.'8 However, the Bolivian campesino did, on the average, sell 
and consume a greater quantity of virtually every agricultural gO(1d pro-
duced by the haciendas and ex-haciendas in the region. In any case, the 
Peruvian campesinos did not greatly benefit from their relatively higher 
labor productivity; nor did the Bolivian campesinos grievously suffer from 
their lower productivity. There was, in short, little relationship between 
labor productivity and remuneration, at least in this respect. 
TABLE 9 
PERUVIAN CAMPESINO WAGES AND SALARIES 
(II/ Dollars) 
II 
Gross wages $3,097 $557 
State taxes' 124 22 
Hacienda fees b 1,592 
Net wages $1,381 $535 
Haciendas 
III IV Total 
$4,060 $13,674 $21,388 
162 547 855 
720 2,312 
$3,178 $13.127 $IR.221 
Note: These wages and salaries do not include the salaries of the administra-
tors. See table 1 on p. 303 for the number of families in each hacienda. 
a. A 4 percent social security tax. 
b. Compulsory payments made to the landowners for the use of pasture 
and cultivable hacienda land. 
Tablc 10 gives the impression that the Peruvian campesino, on the 
average, earned twice as much money income as the Bolivian. But, when 
one recalls that this table only includes income earned from the produc-
tion of the haciendas and ex-haciendas, the higher money income of 
the Peruvian campesino may be no more than an illusion. While inter-
viewing the Bolivian campesinos, it became apparent that they had a 
source of money income unavailable to the Peruvians-namely, outsiue 
employment. The obvious reason for the Peruvian campesinos' inability 
to work outside the haciendas is that their labor time was fully utilized by 
the landowners. Each Peruvian campesino had assigned to his care be-
tween fOllr hundred and five hundn:d hcad or liVl.'stock which his family 
herded, while he devoted most of his working time to the cultivation of the 
hacendado's land, the shearing of his sheep, and the maintenance of his 
buildings and other physical plants. He and his family accomplished all 
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this in addi tion to farming land for their exclusive benefit and caring for 
their own animals. 
Such was not the case on the Bolivian ex-haciendas, where the campe-
sinos often worked part time in the Yungas and elsewhere as agricultural 
laborers and in La Paz as seasonal construction workers. Unfortunately, 
due to an oversight in the construction of the questionnaire, no estimate 
of the money income received by all the surveyed Bolivian campesinos 
for this outside employment was obtained. Only the campesinos of one 
TABLE 10 
EsTIMATED CAMPESINO INCOMES mOM HACIENDA AND Ex- HACIENDA 
PRODllCTION 
(III Do/lars) 
Moiley wages 
Other money income' 
Total money income 
Income-in-kind b 
Total income ' 
Money income per family 
Total income per family 
Peruvian 
Campesinos 
$18,221 
7,019 
$25,240 
10,738 
$35,978 
$144.22 
205.59 
Bolivian 
Campesinos 
$ -
51,451 
$ 51,451 
97,604 
$149,055 
$ 77.35 
222 .80 
a. Earnings frum the sale of agricultuntl products. Sce table IS, 
p.336. 
b. Consumption of agricultural products. These figures were obtained 
by subtracting the value of products sold in table IS from the value of 
output in table 14. 
c. These figures do not include off-the-farm income. 
ex-hacienda were asked to reveal the source and amount of such wages. 
Approximately one-half of these cainpesinos were employed at least 
part time outside the ex-hacienda during the agricultural year 1964-1965 
i and earned between six and twenty-five dollars a month for their labor. A 
very rough estimate of the average amount of money income earned per 
campesino would be between fifty and seventy-five dollars per year. 
In short, it may very well be that the Bolivian campesino earned not 
only a greater total income but also a greater money income than 'the 
Peruvian campesino. 
CAMPESINO CONSUMPTION 
Another indieatiofl that the Bnlivian campcsillos had greater money 
incomes and, therefore, total incomes was their apparent higher st'lndard 
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of living reflected in a greater consumption of manufactured goods and 
other purchased products. In figure 2 one sees that the 167 Bolivian cam-
pesinos interviewed owned more durable goods of all types than the same 
number of Peruvian campesinos-with the notable exception of bicycles. 
Figure 3 shows that the Bolivian campesinos purchased more "store-
bought" dry goods. They also claimed to have worn these dothes llIore 
Percentage 
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o BOLIVIAN CAMP[SINOS • PERUVIAN CAMP[SINOS 
FIG. 3. STORE-BOUGtlT DRY GOODS OWNED BY SAMPLED CAMPESINOS 
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frequently than their Peruvian neighbors. Finally, figure 4 indicates that 
the Bolivian campesinos purchased and consumed more "luxury" foods 
and stimulants than the Peruvians.19 In addition, one out of every two 
Bolivians interviewed slept on wood or iron beds, as compared with only 
one out of every ten Peruvians. Finally, nearly 60 percent of the Bolivian 
campesinos had constructed new homes since 1953 while the Peruvians 
had huilt no new ones. 
Percentage 
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FIG. 4. CONSUMPTION OF l.UXURY FOODS AND STIMULANTS BY SAMPLE!> CAMPESINOS. 
Percentages for coca, sugar, rice, and coffee represent daily consumption, while those 
for tobacco, alcohol, and beef reflect weekly consumption. 
Bolivian campesinos could have consumed greater quantities of these 
goods than the Peruvian campesinos without higher money incomes if 
prices were sufficiently lower in the Bolivian sector or if they had incurred 
larger consumption debts, of course. Although price data are very scarce, 
unreliable, and often rendered virtually useless by inflation, it seems that 
Qurable goods and clothing were less expensive in Bolivia because of the 
lower import duties and the nearness of the sampled ex-haciendas to the 
major distribution center of La Paz. Coffee, tobacco, and similar ~gricul­
tural products are also grown in the Yungas, a region of Bolivia which 
borders the Altiplano, and this proximity made it possible for the Bolivian 
campesinos to obtain these products at lower prices . In short, lower 
prices in the Bolivian sector probably did account for a small part of the 
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higher consumption of' the Bolivian campesinos. None of this difference in 
consumption can be attributed to indebtedness, however, since campe-
sinos, in general, were not debtors due to their unwillingness and inability 
to borrow. As seen in table 11, only a fraction of the Bolivian and Peru-
vian campesinos interviewed were in debt, and the amounts they owed 
were very small. ~o 
In SIIIlI, the evidc 11CC uccull1ulakd in this slIIdy illdicall"s that thl~ 
Bolivian campesino, on the average, had a greater total im:ollle, a 
higher standard of Ii v ing, and possibly a greater money income than his 
TABLE 11 
DISTRIBUTION OF INDEBTEDNESS OF CAMPESINOS INTERVIEWED 
(In Dol/ars) 
Peruvian Campesinos 
Number Amount 
Creditor in Debt of Debt 
Hacienda administrators 5 $ 150 
Friends and neighbors 20 480 
Families 8 280 
Businessmen 5 105 
Agricultural banks 1 225 
Total 39 $1,240 
Bolivian Campesinos • 
Number 
in Debt 
25 
6 
2 
1 
34 
Amount 
of Debl 
$257 
43 
24 
333 
- ---
$657 
a. The Bolivian cam pes ino debt does not include a $ t 5,827 debt of the cooperative (If 
cx-huciclIllu I whidl is owed tll the Agricultuntl Bunk for the ex-hucicmlud .. property. 
Peruvian counterpart during the agricultural year 1964-1965. Indeed, 
because of the lower demand placed upon his labor and time, the Bo-
livian campesino had gr~~ter leisure, which in itself is a form of income. 
When the more than five hundred campesinos not interviewed-nearly 
all of them Bolivians-are taken into consideration, the Bolivian ex-
haciendas, with half t:he land extension of the Peruvian haciendas, pro-
vided a comparable Iiving for four times as many campesinos. Conse-
quently, the purchase and consumption of manufactured goods typically 
used by the campesi.I::lOs were substantially greater on the Bolivian ex-
haciendas than on the Peruvian haciendas. 
In regard to the disposition of the incomes of the Peruvian hacendados 
and administrators, a very rough estimate of the economic profit of the 
four haciendas would be about $80,000. In addition, the administrators 
drew salaries totaling approximately $5,000. The administrators probably 
spent the greater pe:lrt of their sa1arics in Puno, and this income and 
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consumption of manufactured products should be added to that of the 
Peruvian campesinos. On the other hand, a portion of the recent invest-
ment in the haciendas was debt financed, as evidenced by the $25,000 
they owed to local banks. Apparently. most of the hacendado economic 
profit was consumed or invested outside the Lake Titicaca region and 
possibly outside the nation. 
CAMPESINO MOBILITY 
There can be little doubt that the Bolivian campesinos were more free 
and mobile than their Peruvian counterparts. This enabled them to 
seek outside employment, engage in political and marketing activity, and 
TABLE 12 
SalOOL ATTENDANCE OF lliE SAMPLED CAMPESINO POPULATIONS 
Peruvians Bolivians 
.-
Combined Combined 
Male Female Average Male Female Average 
Percentage of popu-
lation that has 
attended school· 
(six years old 
and over) 54% 24% 39(/~ 63 % 30% 47% 
Percentage of chi 1-
dren attending 
school (six to 
seventccn YCllrs 
of age) 75 43 59 75 40 58 
a . These figures include all persons who were attending school as well as those who had 
terminated their education. 
most important of all, tp _!r.dl,l~ate themselves and their children. Approxi-
mately one out of every five Bolivian campesinos questioned had at-
.tended some type of adult education course since 1953, as compared with 
approximately one out of every fifteen Peruvian campesinos interviewed. 
Of the adult populations-all those over seventeen years of age-38 
percent of the Bolivians sampled had attended school as compared with 
only 23 percent of the Peruvians. Finally. of the entire sampled population 
over six years of age, 47 percent of the Bolivians and 39 percent of the 
Peruvians had attended or were attending school. The average level of 
education of those who attended or were attending school was 2.83 years 
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for the Bolivians and 2.27 years for the Peruvians. Eleven percent of the 
Bolivians achieved at least a primary education (six years or more) while 
only 6 percent of the Peruvians did so. 
However, in table 12 one notes that approximately 60 percent of both 
the Bolivian and Peru vian school-age cnildrcn (six to seventeen years of 
age) were enrolled in an educational institution. Every Bolivian ex.-
hacienaa sampled had at least one school-nearly all newly constructed 
~while two of the four Peruvian haciendas investigated had no school. 
Also, the teachers of tlle Bolivian ex-hacienda schools were Indians , while 
the Peruvian teachers were blancos ("whites") . In both sectors, females 
were discriminated against with respect to education. Since the land re-
form, however, this b. as been ame1iorated in the Bolivian sector of the 
region. Although the evidence is not overwhclming or conclusive, the data 
TABLE 13 
ILLITERACY OVER SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD 
llo1ivian Campesinos Peruvian Campesinos 
Combined Combined 
Male Female Average Male Female Average 
Unable to speak 
Spanish 400/0 77% 59');; 53 % 88% 71% 
Unable to read and 
write Spanish 43 78 61 55 92 74 
Unable to read, 
write, and speak 
Spanish 39 77 5!1 50 87 6~ 
---.-----------.. ---.---- --
--"-"--- ----
accumulated in the field indicate that the Bolivian campesinos were slightly 
better educated than their Peruvian counterparts (table 13). This in-
creased education has led to a desire for even more. Of the cam pesinos 
interviewed 82 perce nt of the Bolivians professed a desire that their 
children obtain a priI"l:lary (six years) or secondary (eleven years) level 
of education as compared with a similar desire on the part of only 69 
percent of the Peruvians. Finally, the Bolivian campesino adults were ob-
served to be more liter ate than their Peruvian neighbors. 
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 
Other studies of Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas in tne 
Lake Titicaca region Frovide additional information which confirms most 
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of these findings and thus validates the references to the sampled hacien-
das and ex-haciendas as representative of those in the region. For example, 
the Viaeha study of eleven ex-haciendas shows that the sixty sampled 
campesinos possessed an average of seven hectares of land and sixty-six 
head of livestock (U.A.O.'s) and cultivated approximately one and a 
half hectares. 21 
Another study found half the campesinos on three Altiplano ex-hacien-
das with incomes averaging $125 from outside employment!· Likewise, 
a sample study of fifty haciendas in the department of Puno, Peru, pro-
vides evidence which indicates that the campesinos on these estates 
earned npproxillwtcly the same income as the Peruvian campesinos inter-
viewed in the field. According to this report the average campesino had 
exclusive use of about six hectares of land, owned between 125 and 220 
head of livestock (U.A.O.'s) and shepherded between 300 and 600 
U.A.O.'s per family." In short, because they so closely resembled the 
Peruvian campesinos interviewed by this writer in terms of resources, 
production, and productivity, it is reasonable to expect their incomes to 
have been quite similar. In only one respect were the haciendas investi-
gated by this writer different-all four of these haciendas paid their 
campesinos the minimum wage, while only half of the fifty haciendas in-
vestigated by the Agrarian Reform Office fully complied with the 
decree. But in general, there is every reason to expect the incomes of 
other campesinos in the region, both Peruvian and Bolivian, to approxi-
mate those of the campesinos interviewed by this author. Were it not for 
compulsory wage payments, the Peruvian campesinos would have had 
much lower incomes and standards of living than the Bolivians. Since 
this law has only been in existence since 1964, the Bolivian cnmpesinos 
in the region, until very recently, probably had a much higher income than 
the Peruvian campesinos. 
There is also additional evidence to support the study'S findings that the 
Bolivian campesinos were more educated and literate than their Peruvian 
counterparts. In the Bolivian sector the Viacha study found 46 percent of 
the adult campesinos unable to speak Spanish and 50 percent illiterate. 
The study of fifty haciendas in the department of Puno, Peru, found one-
half to have no schools 2. and the remainder to be "deficient." It has been 
estimated that 43 percent of the rural children between the ages of five 
and fourteen in the department of Puno were enrolled in school during 
1963. The same report estimated the rural illiteracy rate for adults in the 
department to be 71 percent." Since these estimates are similar to those 
arrived at by this author based upon independent samples, they lend 
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support to the con ten tion that the Bolivian campesinos on the ex-hacien-
das in the region were more literate and more educated than the Peruvian 
campesinos on the oth er side of the border. 
THE EFFECTS OF THE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM 
UPON HUMAN RESOURCES 
Once again, the question arises as to what extent these differences in 
freedom, mobility, income, and education between the Bolivian campe-
sinos and the PeruviaIl campesinos can be attributed to the Bolivian land 
reform of 1953. Did the tenancy conditions of thl' Boliviiln latifnndio 
land-tenure system res trict the freedom and mobility of the Indian tenants, 
and were these arran~ements largely responsible for their low standards 
of living, education, and literacy? And if so, did the Bolivian land reform 
make it possible for the Bolivian campesinos to achieve higher incomes, 
standards of living, an.d education? 
INCOME AND CONSUJVl:PTION BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE LAND REFORM 
To reiterate, the Peruvian haciendas investigated in many respects 
did not resemble the (lrereform Bolivian haciendas. This is most obvio\.ls 
with respect to the tenancy arrangements. Below is a list of the rights and 
obligations of the Bolivian hacendado and his Indian tenants under the 
prereform latifundio land-tenure syste~. 
Obligations of the Hacendado 
1. To provide each colono with a tract of cultivahle land, called a 
sayana, from wh ich he is entitled to aU production and upon which 
he can build his own house out of such materials as are at his dis-
posal. This sayana includes the piece of land for his house and a 
composite of fre gman ted parcels in various ainokas-tracts of land 
devoted to a par ticular crop each year and rotated so that one year 
it is planted in potatoes, the next in barley, etc. 
2. To allow the co 10no certain rights to pasture his livestock on ha-
cienda land which is not being either used for crops or reserved ex-
clusively for graz:ing the hacendado's livestock. 
3. To grant the colono certain rights to irrigation water which is not 
being used on the lands exclusively reserved for the hacendado. 
4. To furnish the colono with coca and occasionally a noonday meal 
during periods of heavy labor such as seeding, harvesting, etc. It 
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was often customary to provide the campesino with alcohol for the 
festivities that usually followed occasions such as a good harvest. 
Obligations of the Colonos 
I. To devote three days of each week (usually Monday, Tuesday, and 
Wednesday) to the lands or properties of the hacendado. During 
the cropping seasons the colo no worked as many days as were 
needed to complete the tasks-which often exceeded the customary 
three day per week obligation!" 
2. To furnish his own tools, oxen, burros, etc., as well as family mem-
bers to prepare, seed, and harvest the crops of the hacendado and 
carry the produce to market or the town house. 
3. To assume certain responsibilities for the care of the hacendado's 
livestock, land, and buildings. 
4. To prepare periodically the products of the hacienda such as tunta 
and chuRo ("dehydrated potatoes"), etc. 
5. To provide certain personal services to the hacendado and admin-
istrator at both the estate and town house. These services included 
kitchen duties, collecting fuel, running errands, etc!' 
Before the land reform the Bolivian landowners, with few exceptions, 
did not pay their laborers and tenants a money wage, but they did demand 
agreat deal of the colono's labor-time for their estates. Because the Bo-
livian campesino had about the same quantity of land and livestock be-
fore the land reform as he does today but substantially less labor-time, 
he probably produced less on his sayana. In addition, because a great deal 
of his labor-time was expended in shepherding the landowner's animals, 
working his lands, and providing him with 'personal services, the Indian 
tenant was not free to engage in outside employment. Therefore, one can 
he reasonably certain that the Bolivian campesinos hcfore thc land reform 
did not earn money income outside the estates as they do today. 
There can be little doubt that the Bolivian land reform gave the campe-
sinos the freedom, mobility, and time which has enabled them to obtain 
greater income. In addition, the Bolivian campesinos not only had higher 
per capita incomes in 1964-1965 but also supported approximately 50 
percent more people on the same estate lands than they did before 1953. 
Because the Bolivian land reform redistributed most of the land previously 
used exclusively by the landowners to these new campesinos, it is the 
redistribution of labor-time which was the most significant benefit re-
ceived by the ex-colonos. While it cannot be denied that the higher income 
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and standard of living enjoyed by the Bolivian campesinos were achieved 
largely at the expense of the expropriated landowners, neither can it be 
denied that a part of the increased campesino income was a result of their 
increased output on the former estate lands and their outside employment. 
This redistribution of income, in turn, created for the first time in Bo-
livia's history a mass consumption demand in the agrarian sector for 
manufactured products which could-be domestically produced. Unlike the 
landowners of prerevolutionary days, the campesinos did not consume 
imported goods. Unfortunately, n!,!ither did they purchase investment 
goods such as fertilizer, tools, etc. Even more regrettable from a develop-
mental point of view was the inability of the domestic manufacturing 
sector to provide the clothing, bicycles, transistor radios, etc., which the 
campcsinos purchased. 
EDUCATION AND LITERACY BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE LAND REFORM 
The Supreme Decree of August 19,1936, required all Bolivian haciendas 
with more than twenty-five colono families to maintain a school for the 
education of their children. However, as in Puno, Peru, today, many of 
the Bolivian landowners did not comply with the law. For example, the 
1946 ministry of agriculture study reported approximately one-fifth of 
the sampled haciendas to be without schooling of any type, in violation 
of the law. Also, where schools were provided, the facilities were reported 
to be "deficient"; only 11 percent of the school-age children were in at-
tendance, the school buildings were "inadequate," the teachers "under-
paid," and the quality of teaching "substandard." The study also pointed 
out that the Indian tenants themselves were often required to pay the 
salaries of the teachers. The end result of this latifundio educational sys-
tcm was an illiteracy rate as high as 97 percent Oil SOIlIC of the hacielldas 
investigated."" To the Bolivian landowners, the cost of cdUl:ating the Indian 
children on their estates was very real and current, whereas the benefits 
to them, if any, were intangible and remote. William H. Nicholls recog-
nized this problem when he wrote: 
Increasingly, the principle source for financing social overhead, the socio-
politically dominant landlord class will rarely be willing to tax itself in order 
to support such public services as education and agricultural extension.2• 
In sum, the latifundio land-tenure system was largely responsible for the 
low educational level and high illiteracy rate of the rural population in 
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the Bolivian sector of the region before the land reform. Undoubtedly, 
such a low level of investment in human resources contributed to the 
relatively poor economic performance of these prereform haciendas. 
In the Bolivian sector of the L.ake Titicaca region, education has greatly 
increased since the land reform of 1953. Because the Bolivian campesino 
was no longer required to work for the landowner and because his small 
saya.fia never did require all his family's labor and time, he, and espe-
cially his children, experienced enforced leisure. In contrast to the land-
owners' expenses, the cost of education to him was nominal in both 
money so and foregone opportunity and the potential benefit great. 
William Carter, who also has found education to be permeating the Bo-
livian ex-haciendas, has given one of the reasons for it: 
The new roles of the syndicate leaders, particularly those of the secretary 
general and recording secretary, require these officials to be men with both a 
speaking and writing knowledge of Spanish. Since schools arc a fairly recent 
innovation in the rural areas of the Altiplano and just about the only bilingual 
people are those who have attended formal classes, this requirement practically 
rules out the elder men as candidates for places of authority. Thus, the very 
basis of qualification for leadership has been altered. Youth has replaced age.at 
It should be emphasized that this increase in education is in the form 
of more education, not a better quality of education. In addition, the Bo-
livian !and reform may not have been the sole factor responsible for the 
postrevolutionary surge in campcsino education and literacy. Apparently, 
however, the new land-tenure system is more conducive to the develop-
ment of human resources than was the former system. 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM 
ON THE PERUVIAN SECTOR 
Before summarizing, a slight digression is warranted to analyze the 
effects of the Bolivian land reform upon the economic performance of the 
haciendas and human resources in the Peruvian sector of the Lake Titi-
caca region. Since the Bolivian land reform undoubtedly influenced the 
Peruvian lawmakers in the passage of the 1964 Punonian agrarian reform 
and minimum wage decrees, it was also partly responsible for a number 
of changes in the Peruvian sector of the Lake Titicaca region. Since 1964 
there has occurred an exodus of Peruvian campesinos from the hacienda 
to the indigenous communities and towns within the department as well 
as to the cities of Arequipa and Lima. In addition, the landowners have 
been investing in a better breed of livestock and improved agricultural 
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machinery. These changes have given rise to a greater specialization in 
ranching and thus to a more extensive use of the land. As a result, labor 
productivity has undoubtedly increased. For the hacendado, these changes 
have probably contributed to a more efficient use of the labor resource 
and a more inefficient use of land. Production for the market undoubtedly 
has increased, especially the sale of wool abroad. 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint the fOfCI!d migration from the ha-
ciendas intensified the population pressure on the minifundios ("small peas-
ant farms") and indigenous communities in the area. This caused an in-
crease in the farming of more marginal and less fertile land than that 
which was lying idle on the large haciendas. In addition, this forced 
migration to the overcrowded towns and cities increased the numbers of 
unemployed and poor urban dwellers. 
However, these decrees did reduce the campesino populations on the 
haciendas and made wage payments to those rcmail}ing compulsory, all 
of which meant a higher income and standard of living for the remaining 
Peruvian campesinos. The greatest production cost of the sampled ha-
ciendas was wage payments. Prior to the 1964 minimum wage decree, 
this cost was virtually nonexistent. This higher income has indirectly 
enabled the hacienda campesinos to obtain more freedom, education, 
and literacy. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining whether these 
changes would have occurred in Peru had there been no land reform in 
Bolivia. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to analyze the socioeconomic 
effects of the Bolivian land reform upon human resources in the Lake 
Titicaca region by means of a comparison of Peruvian haciendas and 
Bolivian ex-haciendas. Most striking was the remarkable similarity in the 
poor economic performance of those different agricultural units of produc-
tion operating under dissimilar tenure conditions. Neither the haciendas 
nor the ex-haciendas were realizing economies or diseconomies of size 
under existing technological and institutional conditions. Indeed, no de-
finitive value-neutral statement could be made about the relative effici-
ency of either group. With respect to technology, livestock density per 
hectare, total production, capital productivity, and production for the 
domestic market, the haciendas and ex-haciendas in the region were 
virtually indistinguishable. 
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The most differen'tiating feature of these land-tenure systems was their 
utilization of human resources, On the Bolivian ex-haciendas, the h.igh 
population density and incomplete use of campesino labor-time largely 
account for their relatively higher land productivity and employment, as 
well as their lower labor productivity and agricultural surplus, In spite of 
the much lower labor productivity on the ex-haciendas, the Bolivian 
campesinos still earned greater per capita incomes during the agricultural 
year 1964-1965 and, apparently, enjoyed a ,higher standard of living, In 
large part this can be attributed to the lower demand placed on their labor 
and time by ex-hacienda production, enabling them to seek outside em-
ployment and engage in more marketing activity, Finally, the Bolivian 
campesinos were observed to be better educated, more literate, and better 
integrated into both the market economy and society than their Peruvian 
counterparts, 
It was also emphasized in this chapter that the Bolivian haciendas in 
the region were, to a significant degree, mere agglomerations of small 
Indian sayanas. With the advent of the Bolivian land reform, the Indian 
tenants obtained possession of their sayafias, and most of the land previ-
ously used exclusively by the landowners was redistributed to new cam-
pesinos. Population on the ex-haciendas increased and more marginal 
land was put into production, As a result, t?tal production increased, l!!bor 
productivity decreased, and capital (livestock) productivity remained vir-
tually unchanged, Total production as well as market production exceeded 
prereform levels, largely because of the increased inputs of marginal land 
and labor. Because ng size economies were realized by the Bolivian ha-
ciendas, none were lost as a consequence of the land reform. Whether any 
potential size economies were therefore destroyed by the Bolivian land re-
form is a purely academic question. The creation of small economic units 
of production does not, however, preclude taking advantage of size econo-
mies through cooperative efforts, if capital funds and new t~hnology were 
made available to the Bolivian campcsinos through state agricultural ex-
tension and credit services, Finally, because alternative employment in 
Bolivia is limited, the increase in marginal subsistence farming might be 
considered an efficient allocation of resources in the short run. 
On the one hand, contrary to the expectations of some land-reform 
proponents, this analysis indicates that the Bolivian land reform was not a 
panacea for the Lake Titicaca region's agricultural and economic prob-
lems. On the other hand, contrary to the dire predictions of land-reform 
opponents, no evidence was found to indicate that the region's agricultural 
and general economic efficiency and progress have grievously suffered as 
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a consequence of land reform. These results support those who say that 
institutional changes such as the Bolivian land reform have little effect 
upon production, productivity, and efficiency in the short run. 
However, in the Lake Titicaca region it was man, not land, capital, pro-
duction, or productivity, who underwent the greatest transformation with 
the implementation of the Bolivian land reform. The redistribution of 
land and, above all, labor and time made it possible for the Bolivian 
campesinos to earn higher per capita incomes from production on the ex-
haciendas, to increase their marketing activity, and to engage in outside 
employment. Their increased income not only raised the campesinos' 
standard of living but also created an agrarian demand for manufactured 
products capable of domestic production. 
The Bolivian land reform was not merely a redistribution of land, labor 
and time, or even income; it was simultaneously a redistribution of op-
portunity, freedom, and power. The campesinos in the region are gradually 
becoming more educated, literate, and integrated into the social, political, 
and economic life of the nation. Where previously the campesino paid a 
labor tax for the land he used, as of 1969 he pays no tax at all and is 
the owner of productive private property."2 If private property is truly 
the institution which "turns sand into gold," then these new property 
owners have as their task what the absentee landowners failed to ac-
complish. If the existence of a socially, occupationally, and geographically 
mobile labor force is conducive to economic efficiency and development, 
then the creation of this institution by the Bolivian land reform augurs 
well for the attainment of these national goals. Bolivian society is no longer 
divided into Indians and Bolivians as before the MNR revolution and 
land reform, and the uncertain future of Bolivia will undoubtedly be 
greatly influenced by the campesino majority who are now free either to 
succeed or to fail on their own merits. The full impact of these changes 
will probably not be realized, however, until at least decades, and perhaps 
generations, have elapsed. 
NOTES 
I. Land tenure is the term used for all rights and r.:lationships that have been cre-
ated among men to govern their affairs with respect to the land. Land tenancy is the 
system under which land is operated and its product divided between the operator 
and owner. 
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2. Erich H. Jacoby et aI., IlIler·Relatio/l.\hip between Agrariall Reform a",1 Agrim/-
tural Development, Food and Agricultural Organization of tbe United Nations (Rom.:, 
Italy, September 1953), p. 63. 
3. Bolivia, Junta Nacional de Planamiento, Plan "aciollal de desarrollo economico 
y social, 1962-1971 (La Paz, 1961). 
4. Medium properties and agricultural ellterprises were defined as those estates 
which use wage labor, modern technology, capital equipment, and produce for the 
market. 
5. Victor Paz Estenssoro, La revolucion boliviana (La Paz, 1966), p. 19. 
6. See map in figure I on p. 306 for the location of the sampled haciendas and ex-
haciendas. 
7. See ONERN y CORPUNO, Program de illventario y evaluacioll de las recursos 
naturales del departamento de PUIIO, vol. 5 (Lima, 1965), chap. 7. 
8. In accordance with the provisions of the Peruvian Ley de Reform Agraria no. 
15037 of November 25, 1964. 
9. Because the material in this and the following section of the study has been 
published elsewhere, only the salient findings will be summarized in this chapter. For 
a more detailed presentation of this economic analysis of the haciendas and ex-ba-
ciendas, the reader may consult my "Land Reform and Its Effect Upon Production 
and Productivity in the Lake Titicaca Region," Economic Del'e/opmellf arId Cultural 
Change (April 1970), pp. 410- 50. 
10. This difference in land use was not a consequence of soil fertility, irrigation , or 
surface configuration. Neither the haciendas nor the ex-haciendas irrigated more than 
a small portion of their pastures. Also, hilly land is often more suitable for cultivation 
tban level land since it affords some protection against frosts. 
II. On two of the haciendas investigated, the administrators personally managed 
the estates only when their organizing abilities were most needed--<luring planting, 
harvesting, ~hearing, etc. Indeed, this was not always the case; this writer arrived at 
one of the haciendas with the administrator to find the land prepared and the seed 
planted, all accomplished without the help of the administrator or the new tractor. 
12. See table 14 for a breakdown of these total value outputs by product and pro-
ducer. 
13. See table 15 for a breakdown of this production for the market by product and 
producer. 
14. Although the Bolivian and the Peruvian campesinos owned approximately half 
as many sheep as the Peruvian landowners, they sold almost no wool. According to 
the agricultural experts of the Utah Team for AID/ Uolivia, there is a potential market 
for this criollo wool and the minimum wool export value to Bolivia is estimated to be 
about $12 million a year. Kenneth N. Roberts et aI., Bolivian Wool: A Source 0/ 
National Wealth, mimeographed (AID, January 1966) . 
15. Sol Tax, Penny Capiw/i.Hn (Chicago, III., 1963), p. 12. 
16. Theodore W. Schultz, Trtlllofformilig Traditional Agriculture (New Huven, 
Conn., 1964), p. 131. 
17. Philip M. Raup, "The Contribution of Land Reforms to Agricultural Develop-
ment: An Analytical Framework" Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
3 (October 1963), p. 13. 
18. See tables 16 and 17 for this difference in market price. 
19. It has been suggested that the Indians chew coca to deaden the pain of the hard 
labor they are required to perform. This study seems to confirm this proposition inas-
much as the Peruvian campesinos did work harder than the Bolivians and chewed 
more coca. 
TABLE 14 
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCIS SoLD AND CoNSUMED 
(In Dollars) 
Peru Bolivia 
Product Campesinos Hacendados Total Cooperatives Campesinos Total 
Animal 
Sheep 5 5,159 $ 46,166 5 51,325 $1 ,117 5 18,258 :Ii 19,375 
Cattle 4,198 14,397 18,595 215 28,665 28,880 
Alpaca & Llama 605 65 670 3,660 3,660 
Pigs 20 20 90 3,185 3,275 
Wool 200 64,890 65,090 475 1,475 1,950 
Milk 9,300 9,300 
Cheese 3,300 3,185 6,485 525 19,965 20,490 
Hides 2,550 3,450 6,00J 720 5,955 6,675 
Subtotal $16,032 $141,453 $157.485 $3,142 $ 81,163 $ 84.305 
Crop 
Potatoes S 675 $ 3,995 S 4,670 $ 960 $ 26,490 $ 17,450 
Quinua 285 535 820 20 1,100 1,120 
Cafiahua 340 75 415 1,100 1,100 
Barley 425 1,800 2,225 125 14.265 14,390 
Habas 4.790 4,790 
Dca 15.900 15.900 
Subtotal S 1,725 $ 6.405 :Ii 8.130 51 ,105 $ 63.645 $ 64,750 
Total SI7,757 S147,858 S165,615 $4,247 $144,808 $149,055 
Plus 4.630 • 4.630 • 
Grand Total 517.757 $152,488 $170,245 $4,247 5144,808 SI49,055 
a. 'This fiaure is an imputed value for crop production on forty hectares of hacienda IV based upon the performance of the other haciendas. 
TABLE 15 
VALUE OF P RODL'crs SOLD BY TIlE PERUVIAN H ACIENDAS AND BOLIVIAN EX-HACIENDAS 
(In Dol/ars) 
Peru Bolivia 
Product Campesinos Hacendados Total Cooperalives Campesinos Total 
Animal 
Sheep $1.194 $ 40,539 $ 41 ,733 $ 978 $ 7,587 $ 8,565 
C.attle 4,106 14,349 18,455 217 26,861 27.078 
Alpaca & Llama 46 46 3,226 3,226 
Pigs 88 2,457 2,545 
Wool 64.899 • 64,899 475 475 
Milk 9.298 9,298 
Cheese 1.650 1.097 2,747 145 7.898 8.043 
Hides 23 2,604 2.627 185 185 
Subtotal $7.019 $132.786 $139,805 $1.903 $48,214 $50.117 
Crop 
Potatoes $ - $ 1.250 $ 1,250 S 120 $ 414 S 534 
Quinua 21 40 61 
Caiiahua 388 388 
Barley 125 45 170 
Habas 266 266 
Oca 303 303 
Subtotal $ - $ 1.638 $ 1.638 $ 266 $ 1;068 $ 1,334 
Total $7,019 $134,424 $141 ,443 $2,169 $49,282 $51,451 
Plus 1.180 b 1.180 b 
Grand Total $7.019 $135,604 $142,623 $2.169 $49,282 $51.451 
a. Of this figure, $1 ,104 is the value of alpac.a wool sold ; the remainder is the value of sheep's wool. 
b. This figure is an imputed value for crops sold by hacienda IV based upon performance of the other haciendas. 
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TA8LE 16 
AMOUNn AND AVERAOE :FRICES OF PRODUCTS SOLD AND CONSUMED ON FOUR B OLIVIAN 
Ex-HACIENDAS 
(In Dollars) 
Product 
Sheep 
Rams 
Ewes 
Lambs 
Cattle 
Bulls 
Cows 
Calves 
Llamas 
Pigs 
Hides 
Sheep wool 
Cheese 
Potatoes 
Quinua 
Caiiahua 
Barley 
Habas 
Oca 
Campesino Cooperatives 
-- ---
Average 
Number Unit Price· 
36 S 7.25 
186 4.60 
1 66.65 
2 75.00 
13 6.75 d 
379 l.90 
Average 
Pounds Unit Price· 
1,900 $ 0.25 
1,050 0.50 
16,000 0.03 
700 0.03 
5,000 0.025 
'- '-'-'- --"---'--
Campesinos 
------- --'_._--",-
Average 
Number b Unit Price· 
2,336 S 4.65 
1,692 4.30 
56 2.15· 
376 65.40 
76 43 .25 
20 39.35 
436 8.40 
472 6.75 
3,220 1.85 
Average 
Pounds Unit Price· 
--~ -- -- - - -~ 
5,896 $ 0.25 d 
49,912 0.40 
883,000 0 .03 
43,960 0.025 
44,420 0 .025 
713,220 0.Q2 
136,780 0 .035 
530,048 0.03 
- --
a. All prices are those received in the market for products sold except where indicated. 
b. Total amounts sold Clnd consumed are based upon the statistical averages of those 
campesinos interviewed. 
c. Estimated price based upon the assumption that a lamb, on the average, is worth half 
the value of an ewe. 
d. Imputed prices base~ upon the market prices received by the campesinos or coopera-
tives. 
20. However, the larger size of the average campesino animal herd might be viewed 
as greater savings on their part since livestock is the traditional campesino bank 
account. 
21. Estudio ecoll6mico estatiistico del Callton Viacha, mimeographed (l.a Paz, 
1965) . 
22. Kelso L. Wessel , Social-Ecollomic Comparisoll 0/ Eight Agricultural Com-
munities ill the Oriellte c.lld the Altiplallo, Department of Agricultural Economics of 
Cornell University, mimeographed (La Paz, June 1966), p. 75. 
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TABLE 17 
AMUUNT AND AVEnAlil! PI<ICtS 01' l'ItOlllJCTS SOLO ANIl CONSlJMm ON FOlJlI PERUVIAN 
HACIENDAS 
(Ill Dol/ars) 
Product 
Sheep 
Rams 
Ewes 
Lambs 
Cattle 
Bulls 
Cows 
Calves 
Llamas & Alpacas 
Pigs 
Hides 
Alpaca wool 
Sheep wool 
Cheese 
Potatoes 
Quinua 
Cailahua 
Barley 
Milk 
Campesinos 
Average 
Number' Unit Price b 
9 $ 3.75 
1,825 2.80 
II 1.40' 
59 45.65 
49 30.70 
119 5.10 
3 6.75 
1,700 • 1.50 d 
Average 
Pounds' Unit Price b 
----.. - --_ ..• 
300 • $ 0.26 
800 • 0.15 
6,000 0.55 d 
27,063 0.025 d 
9,504 0.03 d 
11,385 0.03 d 
17,000 • 0.025 d 
Hacendados 
Number 
3,463 
4,544 
250 
138 
116 
15 
13 
2,300 
Pounds 
2,300 
155,590 ' 
5,795 
159,846 • 
17,850· 
2,439 • 
72,1 IO. 
116,221 'Its . 
Average 
Unit Price b 
$ 6.05 
5.40 
2.70 
50.60 
58.15 
44.75 
5.10 d 
1.50 
. Average 
Unit Price b 
-_._-- - -
$ 0.48 
0.41 
0.55 
0.025 
0.03 
0.03 
0.025 
0.08 
a. Total amounts sold and consumed arc based upon the statistical averages of those 
campcsinos interviewed. 
b. All prices are those received in the market for products sold except where indicated. 
c. Estimated price based upon the assumption that a lamb, on Ihe average, is worth half 
the value of an ewe. 
d. Imputed value based upon the market prices received by the campesinos or hacen-
dados. 
e. These ligures (Ire estimates based upon the 11llmher of animals, hectares cultivated, 
lind IIverugc yields . 
f. An estimated 95,000 of this figure is an imputed amount for hacienda IV based upon 
the number of shet:p and average yield. 
g. Crop productioll informalion for one haccndado is not included in these figures . 
Land Reform in the Lake Titicaca Region 339 
23. Sample study of haciendas in the department of Puno, Peru. 
24. By law, the Peruvian haciendas were ro!quired to muint;lin a primary se h"ol 
unly if the numher of school-ugc chil,lren on the eslalc excceded Ihirly . 
25. ONERN Y CORPUNO, Program de invelllario y e\'aiuacioll, pp. 25- 26. 
26. The righls and obligations varied among colonos within a hacienda. If a colono 
was a quarta persona ("fourth of a person"), he was obliged 10 render three labor 
days of service per week to the hacendado in return for the use of a small tract of 
land. However, if he was a media persolla ("half of a person"), he was required to 
provide the landowner with twice as much labor for the use of twice as much land. 
Finally, if he was a persona ("full person"), he and his family gave the hacendado 
twelve labor days of service each week for the use of four times as much land as a 
quarta persona. 
27. Estudio socio-econ6mico en las provi"cias de Omasuyos, l"ga";, y Los A fIdes 
del departamento de La Paz (La Paz, 1946), pp. 24--26, 85-86. 
28. Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
29. William H. Nicholls, "An Agricultural Surplus as a Factor in Economic Devel-
opment," loumai of Political Economy, 71 (February 1963), p. 17. 
30. At the time of this study, the Bolivian government paid the sa laries of the rural 
schoolteachers and provided technical assistance for the construction of these schools. 
In addition, Bolivia had no income or land tax. 
3\. William E. Carter, Aymara Communities alld the Boli,-iall A grariall Reform, 
University of Florida Monograph 24 (Gainesville, Fla .. Fall 1964) , p. 59. 
32. President Barrientos suhmitted a hill to Congress in 19011 10 tax rural lund. As 
of the date of this writing, huwever, it haN not been put into law. 
